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STATEMENT OF ISSUE ON APPEAL 
Whether the trial court properly awarded judgment 
interest from the date of the prior judgment that was reversed on 
appeal instead of from the date of the new judgment following 
remand? 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff-respondent Cleo B. Mason originally filed 
this action against defendant-appellant Western Mortgage Loan 
Corporation (Western) for unauthorized disbursement of 
construction loan funds. In the original trial, the trial court 
found unauthorized disbursements, but dismissed the action 
because Mason had failed to prove that the disbursements had not 
been applied to the construction. (R. 71-72, 83-84; Add. 1-4.) 
This Court reversed, concluding that Mason had satisfied her 
burden of proving damages, and remanded for calculation of those 
damages. Mason v. Western Mortgage Loan Corp., 705 P.2d 1179 
(Utah 1985) (Mason I) (Add. 5-7). 
On remand the trial court heard arguments on damages 
and entered judgment for Mason, with interest from the date of 
the original judgment for Western instead of from the date of the 
new judgment. (R. 184; Add. 8-9.) Western appealed both the 
calculation of damages and the award of judgment interest. (R. 
192.) The parties filed cross-motions for summary disposition, 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
and this Court affirmed the award of damages but declined to rule 
summarily on the interest issue. (Add. 10.) Thus, the sole 
remaining issue on this appeal is whether the trial court 
properly allowed interest from the date of the original judgment. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In 1977 Mason, a real estate developer, entered into 
two loan agreements with Western under which Western was to 
provide funds totaling $54,159 for construction of two houses. 
Western construed the loan agreements to allow disbursements by 
authorization of either Mason or her contractor. Accordingly, 
while most of the loan funds were disbursed upon authorization by 
both Mason and the contractor, approximately $29,000 was 
disbursed at the contractor's sole request and without express 
authorization from Mason. The loan funds did not cover the total 
costs of construction, and Mason paid the completion costs out-
of-pocket. Mason I, supra, 705 P.2d at 1179-80. 
Subsequently, Mason sued Western alleging that the 
disbursement of construction funds without her authorization 
violated the loan agreements and caused her to incur the 
completion expenses above the loan amounts. Western responded 
that its disbursement procedure was authorized by the agreements 
and that, in any event, all the disbursements had been used in 
construction of the houses and none of the money had been 
diverted to other uses. On October 14, 1982, the trial court 
-2-
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ruled in favor of Western. The court found that while Western 
had made some disbursements not authorized by Masonf those 
disbursements would violate the loan agreements only if the money 
was not used for materials or labor on the houses. The court 
found that Mason had failed to prove any of the unauthorized 
payments were diverted from the houses; therefore, the court 
concluded that Mason had suffered no damage and dismissed the 
action. (R. 71-72, 83-84; Add. 1-4.) 
Mason appealed the trial court's judgment, and this 
Court reversed. Mason I, supra, Add. 5. This Court reasoned 
that while Western had the option under the loan agreements of 
isbursing funds directly to the contractor, Western also had the 
ob i ation to ensure that all such disbursements were for work 
done or materials furnished and incorporated into the houses. 
Therefore, the Court held that Mason satisfied her burden of 
proving damages once she established the $29,000 of unauthorized 
disbursements. She was not required to prove how much of those 
disbursements was actually diverted; rather, the burden was on 
Western to prove that the funds were not diverted, but were used 
for Mason's benefit.1 The Court remanded for entry of judgment in 
Mason's favor in the amount of funds wrongfully disbursed less 
any amount Mason conceded or Western established was used to 
Mason's benefit. Mason I, 705 P.2d at 1180-81. The Court made no 
mention of interest on the judgment. 
-3-
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On remand, Mason conceded that all but $15,380 of the 
unauthorized disbursements had been used in construction of the 
houses. Mason proposed a judgment in that amount, plus more than 
three-years interest on the judgment from the date of the trial 
court's original judgment in favor of Western (October 14, 
1982). (R. 146-49.) Western objected to the proposed judgment 
on the grounds that (1) it failed to account for Western's 
evidence that all the disbursements were used on the houses; that 
Mason's damage was caused by accepting an excessively low bid; 
and that, in no event, could damages exceed Mason's out-of-pocket 
completion costs of $14,184; and (2) interest on the judgment 
could be allowed only from the date of its entry. (R. 134-45.) 
On January 31, 1986, the trial court entered judgment for Mason 
in the principal amount requested, plus nearly $7,000 of interest 
from the date of the original judgment for Western. (R. 184; Add. 
8-9.) 
... This time Western appealed, asserting that the trial 
court's calculation of damages and award of interest were 
erroneous. (R. 192.) Both parties moved for summary disposition 
on those issues. On July 30, 1986, the Court summarily affirmed 
the trial court's award of damages but declined to rule on the 
interest issue, leaving that sole issue for this appeal: 
"Appellant is limited to the issue of whether the trial court 
-4-
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properly allowed interest from the date of the entry of the 
previous judgment." (Add. 10.) -
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The general rule is that interest on a judgment accrues 
only from the date of entry of that judgment. Accordingly, when 
a judgment is reversed on appeal with the direction to the trial 
court to calculate damages and enter judgment for the appellant, 
and no mention is made of prejudgment interest, the new judgment 
bears interest only from the date of its entry. Mason is not 
entitled to prejudgment interest because liability and the fact 
of loss were not established until Mason I; the extent of damages 
was not fixed until after the hearing on remand? and Western 
engaged in no unreasonable delay in paying the obligation. While 
this appears to be a case of first impression in Utah, federal 
courts and other state courts have uniformly held that when a 
judgment is reversed on appeal, it is extinguished and the remand 
judgment bears interest only from the date it is entered, not 
from the date of the original judgment. 
ARGUMENT 
WHEN A JUDGMENT IS REVERSED ON APPEAL AND THE CASE IS 
REMANDED FOR CALCULATION OF DAMAGES, THE NEW JUDGMENT 
ENTERED ON REMAND BEARS INTEREST ONLY FROM THE DATE OF ITS 
ENTRY, NOT FROM THE DATE OF THE PRIOR EXTINGUISHED JUDGMENT. 
In Utah, interest on judgments is permitted by statute, 
Utah Code Ann. § 15-1-4 (1953). (Add. 11.) The general rule 
regarding accrual of judgment interest is that interest runs from 
-5-
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the date of entry of the judgment. Rule 54(e), Utah R. Civ. P., 
states that interest on a judgment is to run "from the time it 
was rendered." (Add. 12.) See also Dairy Distributors, Inc. v. 
Local Union 976, 16 Utah 2d 85, 396 P.2d 47 (1964); Schippers v. 
State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins., 30 Utah 2d 404, 518 P.2d 1099 
(1974); 45 Am. Jur. 2d, Interest and Usury §§ 59-60 (1969). This 
general rule governs the award of interest on the judgment in 
this case. •*• f " 
Rule 32, Utah R. Appellate Proc, governing interest on 
appealed judgments, is consistent with this rule. It provides: 
Unless otherwise provided by law, if a judgment for money in 
a civil case is affirmed, whatever interest is allowed by 
law shall be payable from the date the judgment was entered 
in the district court. [Add. 13, emp. added.] 
Under the terms of this Rule, Mason's 1986 judgment may not bear 
interest from the date of Western's 1982 judgment because the 
1982 judgment was not a "judgment for money" and it was not 
"affirmed" on appeal. Rather, Mason's money judgment, which this 
Court summarily affirmed, may bear interest only from the date 
that judgment was entered. 
While this Court has not previously construed U.R.A.P. 
32, federal court construction of its counterpart in the Federal 
Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 37, is persuasive. F.R.A.P. 37 
provides that if a judgment is reversed with a direction for the 
trial court to enter a money judgment, interest may be awarded 
only as specified in the mandate. (Add. 14.) The rule is based 
-6-
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on the Supreme Court's ruling in Briggs v. Pennsylvania, 334 U.S. 
304 (1948), that if the appellate court in reversing a judgment 
is silent as to the award of judgment interest following remand, 
the trial court has no authority to exact interest from the date 
of the first judgment. Thusf where, as in the present case, a 
judgment is reversed and remanded for calculation of damages and 
entry of judgment, without mention of judgment interest, federal 
courts allow interest only from the date of the new, post-appeal 
judgment. See, e.g., Gele v. Wilson, 616 F.2d 146, 149 (5th Cir. 
1980) (party obtaining reversal and seeking interest has burden 
to see that appellate mandate so directs); Riha v. International 
Telephone and Telegraph Corp., 533 F.2d 1053 (8th Cir. 1976); 2 
Fed. Proc, L.Ed. § 3:759 (1981). 
This Court's previous cases that allow prejudgment 
interest under certain narrowly defined circumstances are 
distinguishable from this case. This Court has defined 
"prejudgment interest" as money awarded "due to the opposing 
party's delay in tendering the amount owing under an obligation." 
L & A Drywall, Inc. v. Whitmore Construction Co., 608 P.2d 626, 
629 (Utah 1980). However, prejudgment interest is allowable only 
where liability for a loss and the extent of the loss are fixed 
as of a particular time and the amount of that loss can be 
calculated with mathematical accuracy as of that time. See, 
e.g., Jorgensen v. John Clay and Co.,660 P.2d 229, 233 (Utah 
-7-
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1983); Lyon v, Hartford Ace. & Indemnity Co., 25 Utah 2d 311, 480 
P.2d 739, 745 (1971), overruled on other grounds, 701 P.2d 795, 
798 (1985). Prejudgment interest may not be awarded where 
damages are incomplete or where liability and the calculation of 
damages are uncertain, and the obligor has not delayed unjustly 
in paying amounts due. See, e.g., Bjork v. April Industries, 
Inc., 560 P.2d 315, 317 (Utah 1977); Lyon, supra, 480 P.2d at 
745; Lightcap v. Mobil Oil Corp., 221 Kan. 448, 562 P.2d 1, 15 
(1977). Accordingly, this Court has allowed prejudgment interest 
only in limited cases. For example, prejudgment interest was 
allowed on the amount due under a contract for the sale of sheep 
as of the date of delivery, Jorgensen, supra; on the amount due 
under an insurance policy as of the date of loss, Anderson v* 
State Farm Fire and Casualty Co., 583 P.2d 101, 104 (Utah 1978); 
on amounts due under trust deed notes, Christensen v. 
Commonwealth Land Title Ins. Co., 666 P.2d 302, 308 (Utah 1983); 
and on the liquidated amount due under a settlement agreement, 
Golden Key Realty, Inc. v. Mantas, 699 P.2d 730, 734 (Utah 1985). 
However, the premises and underlying purposes for 
prejudgment interest do not exist in this case. Mason seeks 
prejudgment interest from the date of the original October 1982 
judgment dismissing her action. As of that date, it had been 
judicially determined that Mason had incurred no loss as a result 
of Western's disbursements. Thus, not only were the extent, the 
-8-
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calculability, and the liability for the claimed loss uncertain, 
but the very fact of a loss had been judicially disproves 
Moreover, since it was determined at that time that Western owed 
Mason no obligation, Western engaged in no unjust or unreasonable 
delay in satisfying the obligation. Mason's loss and Western's 
liability therefor were not established until this Court's 
decision in Mason I reversing the October 1982 judgment. The 
extent and calculation of Mason's damages were not fixed until 
the trial court's second, 1986 judgment following remand. 
Therefore, it is evident that Mason is not entitled to 
prejudgment interest under the existing authorities of this 
Court. Rather, the general rule applies to allow interest only 
from the date of the January 1986 judgment. 
This Court has apparently never addressed the precise 
issue presented in this case of whether a judgment following 
appellate remand bears interest from the date of its entry or 
from the date of the prior adverse judgment that was reversed on 
appeal. However, the issue has been addressed by many other 
*In Hewitt v. General Tire and Rubber Co., 5 Utah 2d 
379, 302 P.2d 712 (1956), the Court held that its judgment 
reversing a directed verdict merely reinstated or 
"vitalized" the jury's verdict for the appellant; therefore, 
interest properly ran from the date of the original 
judgment. However, in this case the original 1982 judgment 
was for Western; thus; the Court's reversal of that judgment 
^
n
 Mason I could not possibly be construed as "reinstating" 
a nonexistent judgment for Mason. 
-9-
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state courts, which uniformly hold that judgment interest in such 
cases runs only from the date of entry of the post-appeal 
judgment. This rule is well stated in the leading case of 
Stockton Theatres, Inc. v. Palermo, 55 Cal. 2d 439, 360 P.2d 76, 
78 (1961): 
A judgment bears legal interest from the date of its 
entry in the trial court even though it is still subject to 
direct attack. When a judgment is modified upon appeal, 
whether upward or downward, the new sum draws interest from 
the date of entry of the original order, not from the date 
of the new judgment. On the other hand, when a judgment is 
reversed on appeal the new award subsequently entered by the 
trial court can bear interest only from the date of entry of 
such new judgment. [Citations omitted, emp. added.] 
The case of Yeager Garden Acres, Inc. v. Summit 
Construction Co., 32 Colo. App. 242, 513 P.2d 458 (1973), 
illustrates application of this rule on facts similar to those in 
the present case. There, a building owner sued the contractor 
for breach of the construction contract and obtained a 
judgment. The appellate court affirmed liability, but reversed 
the damage award and remanded for a new calculation of damages. 
On remand the trial court entered judgment with interest from the 
date of the original judgment. On the second appeal the 
appellate court reversed the interest award, holding that 
interest on the judgment following remand could run only from the 
date of that judgment. The court reasoned that even though 
liability was established in the original trial, damages remained 
uncertain until the trial court's determination following remand, 
-10-
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and "interest cannot be allowed on unliquidated claims." Id* at 
461. Moreover, since the extent of damages had not been 
determined until after remand, the defendant could not be 
considered in default for interest until that time. See also 
Morris v. Standard Oil Co., 192 Cal. 343, 219 P. 998, 1003 . 
(1923). 
Other cases on similar facts also allow interest only 
from the date of the remand judgment on the basis that prior to 
that time the extent of damages is uncertain. For example, in 
Cheshire v. Barbour, 481 S.W.2d 274 (Ky. App. 1972), the 
plaintiff obtained a judgment on a contract for personal 
services, but the judgment was reversed for inadequate proof of 
damages. On remand, the plaintiff obtained a second judgment, 
with interest from the date of that judgment. The plaintiff 
appealed, claiming the right to interest from the date of the 
first judgment. However, the appellate court rejected the claim, 
"the amount not being liquidated until the verdict of the jury" 
following remand. Id. at 279. Also, in Cockrill v. Cockrill, 
139 Ariz. 72, 676 P.2d 1130 (App. 1983), the court held that it 
was error for the trial court to award interest on a remand 
judgment from the date of the original reversed judgment. The 
appellate court reasoned that "it would be unfair to charge the 
[defendant] interest when he could not have accurately determined 
-11-
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what sum, if any, he would ultimately be held liable to pay," 
Id, , 676 P.2d at 1133. 
Thus, the rule is uniformly applied that if a judgment 
is reversed on appeal and the case is remanded for determination 
of damages, the new judgment bears interest only from the date of 
that judgment. See, e.g., Rindlisbaker v. Wilson, 95 Idaho 752, 
519 P.2d 421, 431 (1974)? Resner v. Northern Pacific Railway, 161 
Mont. 177, 505 P.2d 86, 92 (1973)? Varney v. Taylor, 81 N.M. 87, 
463 P.2d 511 (1969)? Tome Land & Imp. Co. v. Silva, 86 N.M. 87, 
519 P.2d 1024, 1028 (1973)? Zegman v. State, 99 Misc. 2d 473, 416 
N.Y.S.2d 505 (1979). £f_. Fulle v. Boulevard Excavating, Inc., 25 
Wash. App. 520, 610 P.2d 387 (1980) (citing rule but concluding 
that first judgment was only modified rather than reversed). The 
original judgment, having been reversed, is "wiped out" or 
"extinguished," leaving no basis for the accrual of interest from 
that judgment. See, e.g., Rexnord, Inc. v. Ferris, 69 Or. App. 
146, 684 P.2d 26 (1984)? Cowdery v. London & San Francisco Bank, 
73 P. 196, 197 (Cal. 1903) (legal effect of reversing judgment).2 
zIn the rare case where the full extent of damages is 
determined by the appellate court, leaving only the 
ministerial entry of judgment for the trial court, interest 
may run from the date of the appellate court's remittitur. 
See, e^cj^, Rexnord, jsupra? Haskell v. Forest Land and Timber 
Co. , 426 So.2d 1251, 1254" (Fla. App". 1983]"." "irT'the" present" 
case, however, damages were not determined until remand. 
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Application of this rule is equally compelling in the 
present case. Here, neither Western's liability nor Mason's loss 
was established until this Court's decision in Mason I. That 
decision reversed and extinguished the 1982 judgment in favor of 
Western, but left the extent of Mason's damages uncertain. This 
Court did not calculate the damages; rather, it remanded for the 
trial court to determine what portion of the unauthorized 
disbursements was used for Mason's benefit. Only after that 
determination could the extent of Mason's loss be fixed. Until 
that determination, Western could not be said to have been in 
default or to have unreasonably delayed in paying the 
obligation. Moreover, this Court's mandate in Mason I made no 
mention of judgment interest. Therefore, the trial court had no 
authority or legal basis to award interest on Mason's 1986 
judgment from the date of Western's 1982 judgment. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court erred in awarding judgment interest 
from beyond the date of entry of Mason's January 1986 judgment. 
Therefore, that portion of the court's judgment must be reversed. 
Dated this i^t-day of September, 1986. 
Respectfully submitted, 
KIRTON, McCONKIE & BUSHNELL 
By <S^J$?^ ^<k^X_ 
Gregory S. Bell #0275 
David M. Wahlquist #3349 
Merrill F. Nelson #3841 
Attorneys for Defendant-Appellant 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY ' • '*•' > • 
STATE OF UTAH 
CLEO B. MASON, 
Plaintiff, 
WESTERN MORTGAGE 
LOAN CORPORATION, 
Defendant. 
Civil No. 49,731 
D E C I S I O N 
This matter came before the Court for trial on the 23rd day 
of June, 1982, Jackson B. Howard, Esq** and Fred Howard, Esq., 
appearing for the plaintiff, and Gregory S. Bell, Esq. appearing 
for the defendant. The parties presented their evidence and the 
Court having taken the matter undex-adviseraent, now enters its: 
DECISION 
The Court heard certain testimony subject to a Motion to 
Strike by defendant who claimed that the evidence violates the 
parole evidence rule in that it changes the terms of paragraphs 5 
and 6 of Plaintiff's Exhibits 1 and 5. Although the plaintiff 
claims that ambiguities existed in the two paragraphs which 
require clarification and the assessment of the meaning the 
parties intended to be given the paragraph, the Court concludes 
that the evidence only went to establishing that which was stipu-
lated to by defendant that it paid out over $15,000.00 on both 
houses to the general contractor without the approval of the 
plaintiff, and without requiring lien releases of him from 
material suppliers or laborers. . The evidence showed also that 
other sums had been paid without the approval of the plaintiff, 
but they went to material suppliers or laborers who furnished 
lien releases. That testimony which sought to establish that no 
funds were to be paid except on the written authorization of the 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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plaintiff is stricken from the record and is not considered by 
the Court in arriving at its Decision herein, since it would 
vary the options provided the defendant under paragraph 5 to 
make payments to one other than the Imdersignecf (plaintiff 
herein) as long as such payments were for materials or labor. 
The Court finds that it has been established that defendant 
made payments as above-indicated to the contractor and that no 
lien releases were given to show that these payments were for 
materials or labor incorporated into either home, but the plain-
tiff has failed to prove that the above-mentioned payments to the • 
contractor did not go to pay for material and labors performed on 
the construction of each house, and has therefore failed in her 
proof that she has suffered damage by reason of the disbursements 
made by the defendant to the general contractor without plaintiff's 
authorization. 
Plaintiff's assertion that the defendant has the 
burden of proving that the payments made to the contractor were 
for materials and labor, and that without such proof plaintiff 
should recover the amount of the unauthorized payments to the 
contractor has .no authority cited in support thereof*-' 
The Court therefore concludes that the burden of proof on 
damage remains with the plaintiff, and the plaintiff has failed 
to establish that the payments in question to the contractor 
were diverted to some other purpose than the construction. 
The Court therefore finds the issues in this case in favor 
of- the defendant and against the plaintiff. Counsel for the 
defendant is directed to parepare appropriate Findings of Fact, 
Concludions of Law and Judgment and Order of Dismissal herein. 
Dated at Provo, Utah County, Utah this *2^£, day of July, 
1982. 
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Gregory S. Bell 
GREGORY S. BELL & ASSOCIATES 
Attorneys for Defendant 
376 East 400 South, Suite 210 
Salt Lake City, 0T 84111 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
CLEO B. MASON, 
v » 
WESTERN MORTGAGE 
CORPORATION, 
Plaintiff , 
LOAN 
Defendant. 
1 
J ™ 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. 49,731 
The above entitled matter came for trial on the 23rd 
day of June, 1982. Plaintiff was present and represented by 
and through hei attorneys, Jackson B. Howard and Fred Howard. 
Deiendaut was present and represented by and through its 
attorney Gregory S. Bell. 
The parties having presented their evidence and the 
Court being fully advised in the premises, the Court; finds 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The Defendant paid over $15,000.00 on two houses 
•^..•f~i» by the Plaintiff to the general contractor who was 
biuJuinvj said houses, which payments were made without the 
approval of the Plaintiff and without requiring lien releases 
from seme material, suppliers or laborers* 
2. The Plaintiff failed to prove that said payments 
did not go to pay fcr material and labor used and performed 
within the construction of the houses, 
3. The Defendant paid other sums to the general 
contractor without the approval of the Plaintiff, but which 
3 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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sums went to material suppliers or laborers who furnished lien 
releases. 
From the foregoing Findings of Facts, the Court now 
makes the following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Any testimony which varied the options provided 
the Defendant under paragraph 5 of the Building Loan Agreement 
and Assignment of Account between Plaintiff and Defendant 
dated January 19, 1977 to make payments to one another than 
the "undersigned" (the Plaintiff herein) so long as such 
payments were for materials or labor is stricken from the 
record and is not considered by the Court, in that said 
evidence is not admissable as parol evidence. 
2* The Plaintiff had the burden of proving that the 
payments made to the contractor by the Defendant were not 
used to pay for material or labor and the Plaintiff failed 
to prove the same. 
3. uy virtue of said failure, the Plaintiff failed 
to prove that she had been damaged by the Defendant's actions. 
4. Plaintiff did not show or prove a basis upon 
which attorneys' fees should be awarded to Plaintiff. 
DA'j.'.O U- Prover Utah County, State of Utah, this 
(£{ day of 0$*J~+Zji~ , 1982. 
BY THE COURT: 
^ - ^ r - <f $~JULS 
i George E. BjAllif 
District Court Judge ^ 
Approved as to form: 
Jackson Howard 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
4 
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MASON v. WESTERN MORTG. LOAN CORP- Utah 1 1 7 9 
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examine the State's expert witness in an were applied to the scheduled project pur-
improper manner. suant to loan agreement 
The convictions are affirmed. —•———-— 
HALL, CJ., and STEWART, DURHAM 
and ZIMMERMAN, JJ., concur. 
Cleo B MASON, Plaintiff 
and Appellant? 
t •„ 
WESTERN MORTGAGE LOAN 
CORPORATION, Defendant 
and Respondent 
No. 18951. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Aug. 30, 1985. 
Action was brought against lender 
seeking recovery of damages for wrongful 
disbursal of construction loan proceeds to 
plaintiffs contractor. The Fourth District 
Court Utah County, George E. Ballif, J., 
found that lender had breached loan agree-
ment but ruled that plaintiff had failed to 
establish that she had been damaged, and 
plaintiff appealed The Supreme Court, 
Zimmerman, J., held that plaintiff satisfied 
her burden of proving damages. 
Reversed and remanded. 
Stewart, J.9 concurred in result 
Damages *»189 
Plaintiff satisfied her burden of prov-
ing damages in her action against lender 
for wrongfully disbursing construction loan 
proceeds to her contractor, where lender 
disbursed nearly $29,000 in proceeds, and 
where uncontradicted evidence indicated 
that lender made no bona fide effort to 
determine whether the disbursed funds 
Jackson Howard, Prove, for plaintiff and 
appellant 
Gregory S. Bell and Lester A. Perry, Salt 
Lake City, for defendant and respondent 
ZIMMERMAN, Justice: 
Plaintiff Mason appeals from the trial 
court's dismissal of her claim against de-
fendant Western Mortgage Loan Corpora-
tion for wrongfully disbursing construction 
loan proceeds to her contractor. The trial 
court found that Western had breached the 
agreement, but ruled that Mason had failed 
to establish that she had been damaged. 
We reverse and remand for entry of judg-
ment in Mason's favor. 
In January of 1977, Mason and a building 
contractor entered into an agreement for 
the construction of two houses on two 
building lots she owned. The contractor 
had submitted itemised bids of $28,435 and 
$25,724, respectively, for the two houses. 
Simultaneously with the execution of the 
construction contract, Mason entered into 
two identical standard form loan agree-
ments with Western under which Western 
agreed to furnish Mason with funds for the 
construction of the houses. The amounts 
to be advanced under the two agreements 
corresponded to the amounts set forth in 
the two bids. The loan documents contem-
plated that the loan proceeds would be held 
by Western and disbursed only for labor 
and materials used to construct the houses 
in accordance with the bids attached to the 
loan agreements. The loans were secured 
by the houses and the underlying real es-
tate. • ••' •  
As construction proceeded, the contrac-
tor secured funds from Western by 
presenting it with forms entitled "Contrac-
tor's Authorization for Payment" These 
forms specified the amount to be drawn 
from the loan proceeds and identified the 
person or entity to whom payment was to 
be made. During the first and last stages 
of construction, these slips bore the signa-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
1180 Utah 705 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES 
tures of both the contractor and Mason. 
During the middle stages of the work, how-
ever, when most of the funds were dis-
bursed, the slips were signed only by the 
contractor. 
Several months after construction began, 
Mason was informed that all of the loan 
proceeds had been disbursed. Ten to twen-
ty-five percent of the work on the houses 
remained to be done The contractor's in-
solvency prevented recovery against him. 
Mason brought suit against Western, con-
tending that Western had breached its con-
tract with her by disbursing loan proceeds 
to the contractor without her signature or 
without adequate assurance that the pro-
ceeds were going into the houses, as re-
quired by the loan agreements. 
At trial, Mason argued that the houses 
would have been constructed within the bid-
limit if her authorization had been required 
on all payment slips or, at least,, that she 
would have been in a position to enforce or 
renegotiate the bids with her contractor. 
She introduced evidence that nearly $29,-
000 of the $54,159 loaned had been dis-
bursed to the contractor and the subcon-
tractors at the contractor's sole request 
and approval. Mason conceded that some 
portion of this $29,000 was used in con-
structing the houses, but argued that be-
cause of Western's breach it was impossi-
ble for her to ascertain with any reasonable 
degree of accuracy what portion of these 
funds was wrongfully disbursed. The trial 
court found that Western had breached its 
agreements with Mason, but dismissed her 
claim because she was unable to show what 
portion of the proceeds had gone into the 
two houses and what portion had been oth-
erwise diverted. 
We hold, as a matter of law, that Mason 
had satisfied her burden of proving dam-
1. Paragraph 5 of the two standard form con-
struction loan agreements provides as follows: 
5. Subject to the provisions of this Agree-
ment, the Account shall be disbursed by the 
Lender from time to time as the construction 
of the improvements progress) es] in accord-
ance with (the contractor's itemized bids], in 
amounts respectively equal to the value of the 
labor and materials actually incorporated in 
ages. Once Mason established that West-
ern had breached its contract with her by 
disbursing nearly $29,000 in violation of the 
loan agreements, she had adduced suffi-
cient proof to support an award of dam-
ages in that amount To avoid all or any 
part of this liability, Western had to show 
that some or all of the money it paid direct-
ly to the contractor in violation of the loan 
agreements actually was disbursed for 
work done or materials furnished and in-
corporated into the two houses. The Ian* 
guage of the standard form agreements 
that Western used to state the terms of its 
bargain with Mason dictates this result 
Under the terms of the loan contracts, 
Mason borrowed funds from Western to be 
used solely in constructing the two houses. 
Pursuant to paragraph 5 of the agree-
-rnents, Western retained the funds and 
agreed that it would disburse them "from 
time to time as the construction of the 
improvements progress[ed] in accordance 
with [the contractor's itemized bids] at-
tached hereto, in amounts respectively 
equal to the value of the labor and materi-
als actually incorporated in the improve-
ments " Western retained the right to 
disburse these funds either to Mason for 
payment to others or, at its option, directly 
to contractors, materialmen, or laborers. 
However, consistent with the underlying 
purpose of the contract, all such disburse-
ments were to be only "for work done or 
labor furnished in connection with such im-
provements/' l 
Even if the language of paragraph 5 
were less clear, a review of the whole 
agreement leaves no real question as to 
Western's duties in disbursing the loan pro-
ceeds. Had Western released the funds to 
Mason, she could have taken appropriate 
steps to ensure that the funds were dis-
the improvements since the date construction 
commenced or since the date of the immedi-
ately preceding disbursement from the Ac-
count, as the case may be. Such disburse-
ments may be made to [Mason], or, at the 
option of the Lender, may be made to con-
tractors, materialmen and laborers, or any of 
them, for work done or labor furnished in 
connection with such improvements. 
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bursed only for work actually done on the 
houses Indeed, under paragraph 6 of the 
agreement, Mason had rather extensive 
record keeping and other obligations that 
were specifically designed to assure West-
ern that, in fact, the funds were going into 
the project Construing the terms of para-
graph S in light of the purpose of the 
contract, it is clear that when Western opt-
ed to make payments directly to the con-
tractor or other suppliers, it had an obli-
gation, parallel to Mason's obligation under 
paragraph 6, to ensure that the funds it 
disbursed were for work done or materials 
furnished and incorporated into the houses. 
For just as Western had a legitimate, con-
tractual right to assure itself that the loan 
proceeds actually were incorporated into 
the premises securing the loan, Mason had 
an equally strong contractual right to as-
cover the funds wrongfully disbursed; if 
the bank disputed the corporation's claim 
for damages, it was required to go forward 
with the evidence to establish that the 
funds wrongfully disbursed were actually 
applied to the corporation's benefit 22 
Utah 2d at 4, 447 P.2d at 40.* 
These principles apply equally to the in-
stant case. Western bore the burden of 
establishing that the wrongfully disbursed 
funds were used for Mason's benefit 
Therefore, the trial court should have en-
tered judgment in Mason's favor in the 
amount of the funds wrongfully disbursed 
to the contractor less any amount Mason 
conceded or the bank established was used 
to her benefit 
Because we have resolved the issues in 
this case based on the language of the 
sure herself that the proceeds were dis> contract, we need not consider Mason's 
bursed only for the purpose contemplated 
by the loan documents. The uncontradict-
ed evidence indicates that Western made no 
bona fide effort to determine whether the 
disbursed funds were applied to the sched-
uled project 
In Movie Films, Inc. v. First Security 
Bank 22 Utah 2d 1, 447 P.2d 38 (1968), we 
dealt with an analogous factual situation. 
There, a bank had agreed to disburse funds 
from a corporation's account only when the 
checks were signed by both the corporate 
president and the vice president The bank 
then paid several checks bearing only the 
president's signature. In affirming a judg-
ment against the bank, we held that the 
bank's failure to comply with the terms of 
the agreement entitled the plaintiff to re-
2» In Movie films, the Court said that any contcn 
tion that the corporation benefited by the 
wrongful disbursement of funds was an affirm-
ative defense upon which the bank bore the 
burden of proof. 22 Utah 2d at 4, 447 P.2d at 
40. This statement is not entirely correct. The 
bank did not assert that the corporation failed 
to mitigate its damages. Mitigation of damages 
is an affirmative defense. Pratt v. Board of 
claim that the trial court improperly exclud-
ed parol evidence. 
The matter is reversed and remanded to 
the trial court for entry of judgment in 
Mason's favor in the amount of damages 
established at trial. Costs to appellant 
HALJU CJ., and HOWE and DURHAM, 
JJ., concur. 
STEWART, J., concurs in the result. 
J7\ 
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Education, Utah, 564 P.2d 294, 298 (1977). 
Rather, the bank only disputed the corporation's 
damage claim. While the bank did have the 
burden of going forward with the evidence to 
show that plaintiffs harm was not as great as its 
proof tended to show, it did not carry a "burden 
of proof* because it was not asserting an affirm-
ative defense. 
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HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN ' #} J^y 3 /
 :, 
FRED D. HOWARD, for: . , ; "'f ;•'£ 
•»'.' 
' * * / ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELORS AT LAW 
120 Eatt 300 North Street - : • "' r.
 r> ( .. 
P.O. Box 778 - - ^.purFilej&k? 9390.if ty 
Provo, Utah 84603 - ^ L * - '>; > . 4 
Telephone: (801) 373-6345 "*'* *'':"^ 
Attorneys for Plaintiff * 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
CLEO B. MASON, | 
I JUDGMENT 
Plaintiff, | 
I 
vs. I 
I 
WESTERN MORTGAGE LOAN | 
CORPORATION, | Civil No. 49,731 
t 
Defendant. 
The above-entitled matter came on trial on the 23rd day of June, 1982. The 
plaintiff was present and represented by her attorneys, Jackson Howard and Fred D. 
Howard. Defendant was present and represented by its attorney, Gregory S. BclL 
The parties presented their evidence and the Court was fully advised in the 
premises. The Court has heretofore entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law and did thereafter enter a Judgment and Order of Dismissal as against the 
plaintiff. This matter was appealed to the Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
which reversed and remanded to the trial court entry of this Judgment with reversal 
of that Judgment heretofore entered on the 1st day of February, 1983. Judgment is, 
I Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
therefore, duly entered in favor of the plaintiff as follows: 
Principal: 
Accrued Interest: 
Attorneys i ccs 
Accrued Court Costs: 
TOTAL JUDGMENT: 
$15,380,00 
6,789.86 
x i n n A A 
T^jyv.W 
. 279,59 
ffltJ^CJflPJHHCSl £f^  
u 
DATED at Provo, Utah, this Z'9 day of January, 1986. 
BY THE COURT: 
/2.2-vyf. v r 5-^. 
GEORGE E. fr^LLIF~F 
District Court Judge / 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hei ebj certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing wgc mailed 
/ +k, 
to the following, postage prepaid, this LP day of January, 1986. 
Mr. Gregory S. Bell 
Mr. Lester A. Perry 
Kirton, McConkie & Bushncil 
Attorneys for Defendant 
330 South Third East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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SUPREME COURT OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 
July 30, 1986 
OFFICE OF THE CLERK 
Gregory S. Bell, Esq. 
Oauid M. Wahlquist, Esq. 
Kirton, McConkie & Bushnell 
330 South 300 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
r * 
Cleo B. Mason, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
u. No. 860130 
Western Mortgage Loan Corporation, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
THIS DAY, Appellant's motion to reverse the judgment appealed in 
this matter is hereby denied. 
Respondent's motion to affirm the judgment is granted in part 
and d&nied in part. Most of the issues raised mere previously 
raised and settled in Mason v. Western Mortgage Loan Corporation, 
705 P.2d 1179 (Utah 1985). The judgment is affirmed concerning 
those issues, as the Court properly followed the mandate of this 
Court. Appellant is limited to the issue of whether the trial court 
properly allowed interest from the date of the entry of the previous 
judgment. 
Appellant's brief is due Aug. 30, 1986. 
Geoffrey J. Butler, Clerk 
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15-1-2 CONTRACTS AND OBLIGATIONS IN GENERAL 
15-1-2, 15-l-2a. Repealed. 
Repeals. — Sections 15-1-2, 15-l-2a (L. 1955, ch. 20, § 1; 1965, ch. 25, § 1), relating to 
1907, ch. 46, § 2; C.L. 1907, § 1241x; C.L. maximum interest rates on loans and condi-
1917, § 3321; R.S. 1933,44-0-2; L. 1935, ch. 42, tional sales contracts, were repealed by Laws 
§ 1; C. 1943, 44-0-2; L. 1953, ch. 24, §§ 1, 2; 1969, ch. 18, § 9.103. 
15-1-3, Calculated by the year. 
Whenever in any statute or deed, or written or verbal contract, or in any 
public or private instrument whatever, any certain rate of interest is men-
tioned and no period of time is stated, interest shall be calculated at the rate 
mentioned by the year. 
History: L. 1907, ch. 46, § 7; CX. 1907, 
§ 1241x5; C.L. 1917, § 3328; R.S. 1933 & C. 
1943, 44-0-3. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES -: - '• ••• 
C.J.S. — 47 C.J.S. Interest § 42. 
Key Numbers* — Interest *» 40. 
15-1-4. Interest on judgments. 
Any judgment rendered on a lawful contract shall conform thereto and shall 
bear the interest agreed upon by the parties, which shall be specified in the 
judgment; other judgments shall bear interest at the rate of 12% per annum. 
History: L. 1907, ch* 46, § 11; C.L. 1907, Cross-References. — Interest to be in-
§ 1241x9; C.L. 1917, § 3330: R.S« 1933 & C. eluded in judgment entry, Rules of Civil Proce-
1943, 44-0-4; L* 1981, ch. 73, § 2. dure, Rule 54(e). 
Amendment Notes. — The 1981 amend-
ment increased the interest rate from 8% to 
12%. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Allowance of interest before judgment. 
Amendment of judgment. 
Collection of interest. 
Eminent domain. 
Estates of decedents. 
Federal court judgment. 
Interest during pendency of appeal. 
Late payment of property division in divorce action. 
Personal judgments. 
Prejudgment interest. 
Reinstatement of judgment. 
Renewal of judgment. 
744 
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Rule 54 UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 54 
(d) Costs. 
(1) To Whom Awarded. Except when express provision therefor is made 
either in a statute of this state or in these rules, costs shall be allowed as 
of course to the prevailing party unless the court otherwise directs; 
provided, however, where an appeal or other proceedings for review is 
taken, costs of the action, other than costs in connection with such appeal 
or other proceeding for review, shall abide the final determination of the 
cause. Costs against the State of Utah, its officers and agencies shall be 
imposed only to the extent permitted by law. 
(2) How Assessed. The party who claims his costs must within five days 
after the entry of judgment serve upon the adverse party against whom 
costs are claimed, a copy of a memorandum of the items of his costs and 
necessary disbursements in the action, and file with the court a like 
memorandum thereof duly verified stating that to affiant's knowledge the 
items are correct, and that the disbursements have been necessarily 
incurred in the action or proceeding. A party dissatisfied with the costs 
claimed may, within seven days after service of the memorandum of costs, 
file a motion to have the bill of costs taxed by the court in which the 
judgment was rendered. 
A memorandum of costs served and filed after the verdict, or at the 
time of or subsequent to the service and filing of the findings of fact and 
conclusions of law, but before the entry of judgment, shall nevertheless be 
considered as served and filed on the date judgment is entered. 
(3), (4) [Deleted.] 
(e* Interest and Costs to Be Included in the Judgment The clerk must 
include in any judgment signed by him any interest on the verdict or decision 
from the time it was rendered, and the costs, if the same have been taxed or 
ascertained. The clerk must, within two days after the costs have been taxed 
or ascertained, in any case where not included in the judgment, insert the 
amount thereof in a blank left in the judgment for that purpose, and make a 
similar notation thereof in the register of actions and in the judgment docket. 
Cross reference. As to costs on appeals, see 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure set out 
elsewhere in this volume. 
I. General Consideration. 
II. Multiple Claims and'or Parties. 
III. Demand for Judgment. 
A. Generally. 
B. Specific Cases. 
IV. Costs. 
A. Generally. 
B. To Whom Awarded. 
C. Memorandum of Costs. 
D. Interest. 
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Rule 32 UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE Rule 33 
(e) Precedential Effect Appeals decided under this Rule will not stand as 
precedent of the Court, but, in other respects, will have the same force and 
effect as other decisions of the Court. 
(f) Issuance of Written Opinion. If it appears to the Court after the case has 
been submitted for decision that a written opinion should be issued, the time 
limitation in paragraph (d) shall not apply and the parties will be so notified. 
ADVISORY COMMITTEE NOTE 
There is no prior appellate rule in Utah 
authorizing an expedited appeal without writ-
ten opinion of the Court. The Rule is designed 
to get at and expeditiously dispose of appeals 
which qualify for expedited treatment as de-
fined in paragraph (b) and as to which both 
parties expressly stipulate it may be consid-
ered. 
Paragraph (h). It is not intended that this 
Rule be construed to supplant the ordinary 
calendaring of cases or issuance of written 
opinions by the Court. See Rule 30. Rather, its 
purpose is to aid in disposing of cases involving 
This Rule is designed to ensure that parties 
and their counsel understand that frivolous or 
uncomplicated issues of fact and/or relatively 
well-settled issues of law. Paragraph (b) delin-
eates the type and nature of cases which are 
eligible for expedited treatment. 
Paragraph (el Cases tried by the Court 
under this Rule are not to be considered as 
precedent for any legal issue determined and 
will not be considered within the body or 
principal of law, as stare decisis, of the Court. 
However, a decision under this Rule will have 
the effects of res judicata, collateral estoppel or 
other construction applied to particular deci-
sions under written opinions of the Court. 
clearly unmentorious appeals may result in 
the imposition of single or double costs, includ-
Rnle 32. Interest on Judgment. 
Unless otherwise provided by law, if a judgment for money in a civil case is 
affirmed, whatever interest is allowed by law shall be payable from the date 
the judgment was entered in the district court. 
ADVISORY COMMITTEE NOTE 
There is no prior rule of appellate practice Court, viz., the date the judgment was entered 
governing interest on money judgments. This in the district court. The Rule is, in part, 
Rule clarifies the date interest is calculated on similar to Rule 37 FRAP, 
money judgments that are affirmed by the 
Rule 33. Damages for Delay or Frivolous Appeal; Recov-
ery of Attorney's Fees. 
ta) Damages for Delay or Frivolous Appeal If the Court shall determine 
that a motion made or appeal taken under these Rules is either frivolous or for 
delay, it shall award just damages and single or double costs, including 
reasonable attorney's fees, to the prevailing party. 
(b) Disciplinary Action for Inadequate Representation. The Court may take 
appropriate disciplinary action against counsel who inadequately represents 
his client on appeal. 
ADVISORY COMMITTEE NOTE 
341 
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Rule 3 i. Interest on Judgments 
Unless otherwise provide.! by law. if a judgment 
for money in a civil ease is affirmed, whatever 
interest is allowed by law shall be payable from the 
date the judgment was entered in the district court. 
If a judgment is modified or reversed with a di-
rection that a judgment for money be entered in the 
district court, the mandate shall contain instructions 
with respect to allowance of interest. 
NOTES OF ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON 
APPELLATE RULES 
The first sentence makes it clear that if a money judg-
ment is affirmed in the court of appeals, the interest which 
attaches to money judgments by force of law (see 28 
U.S.C. § 1961 and § 2411) upon their initial entry is pay-
able as if no appeal had been taken, whether or not the 
mandate makes mention of interest There has been some 
confusion on this point. See Blair v. Durham, 139 F.2d 
260 (6th Cir., 1943) and cases cited therein. 
In reversing or modifying the judgment of the district 
court, the court of appeals may direct the entry of a 
money judgment, as, for example, when the court of 
appeals reverses a judgment notwithstanding the verdict 
and directs entry of judgment on the verdict. In such a 
case the question may arise as to whether interes' is to 
run from the date of entry of the judgment directed by the 
court of appeals or from the date on which the judgment 
would have been entered in the district court except for 
the erroneous ruling corrected on appeal. In Briggs v. 
Pennsylvania R. Co., 334 U.S. 304, 68 S.Ct. 1039, 92 L.Ed. 
1403 (1948), the Court held that where the mandate of the 
court of appeals directed entry of judgment upon a verdict 
but made no mention of interest from the date_pf the 
verdict to the date of the entry of the judgment directed 
by the mandate, the district court was powerless to add 
such interest. The second sentence of the proposed rule is 
a reminder to the court, the clerk and counsel of the 
Briggs rule. Since the rule directs that the matter of 
interest be disposed of by the mandate, in cases where 
interest is simply overlooked, a party who conceives him-
self entitled to interest from a date other than the date of 
entry of judgment in accordance with the mandate should 
be entitled to seek recall of the mandate for determination 
of the question. 
R u l e 38. Damages for Deiay 
If a court of appeals shall determine that an 
appeal is frivolous, it may award just damages and 
single or double costs to the appellee. 
NOTES OF ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON 
APPELLATE RULES 
Compare 2fc U.S.C. § 1912. While both the statute and 
the usual rule on the subject by courts of appeals (Fourth 
Circuit Rule 20 is a typical rule) speak of "damages for 
delay/' the courts of appeals quite properly allow dam-
ages, attorney's fees and other expenses incurred by an 
appellee if the appeal is frivolous without requiring a 
showing that the appeal resulted in delav. See Dun-
srombe v. Sayle, 340 F.2d 311 (f>th Cir., 1965), cert, den,, 
:W2 U.S. 814. 86 S.Ct. 32. 15 L Ed.2d 62 (1965); Lour v. 
Willacy. 231) F.2d ITU <»th Cir., 1956); Gn/fUh Wellpoint 
Corp. v. Munro-Lanqstroth, Inc., 269 F.2d 64 (1st Cir.. 
1959); Ginsburg v. Stern, 295 F.2d 698 (3d Cir., 1961) 
The subjects of interest and damages are separately regu-
lated, contrary to the present practice of combining the 
tu<» (see Fourth Circuit Rule 20) to make it clear that the 
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awards are distinct and independent Interest is provide; 
for by law; damages are awarded by the court in its 
discretion in the case of a frivolous appeal as a matter of 
justice to the appellee and as a penalty against the appel-
lant. 
Rule 39. Costs 
(a) To Whom Allowed. Except as otherwise pro-
vided by law, if an appeal is dismissed, costs shali 
be taxed against the appellant unless otherwise 
agreed by the parties or ordered by the court; if a 
judgment is affirmed, costs shall be taxed against 
the appellant unless otherwise ordered; if a judg-
ment is reversed, costs shall be taxed against the 
appellee unless otherwise ordered; if a judgment is 
affirmed or reversed in part, or is vacated, costs 
shall be allowed only as ordered by the court. 
(b) Costs For and Against the United States, In 
cases involving the United States or an agency or 
officer thereof, if an award of costs against the 
United States is authorized by law, costs shall be 
awarded in accordance with the provisions of subdi-
vision (a); otherwise, costs shall not be awarded for 
or against the United States, 
(c) Costs of Briefs, Appendices, and Copies of 
Records. By local rule the court of appeals shall 
fix the maximum rate at which the cost of printing 
or otherwise producing necessary copies of briefs, 
appendices, and copies of records authorized by 
Rule 30(f) shall be taxable. Such rate shall not: be 
higher than that generally charged for such work in 
the area where the clerk's office is located and shall 
encourage the use of economical methods of print-
ing and copying. 
(d) Bill of Costs; Objections; Costs to be In-
serted in Mandate or Added Later. A party who 
desires such costs to be taxed shall state them in an 
itemized and verified bill of costs which the party 
shall file with the clerk, with proof of service, 
within 14 days after the entry of judgment. Objec-
tions to the bill of costs must be filed within 10 days 
of service on the party against whom costs are to be 
taxed unless the time is extended by the court. The 
clerk shall prepare and certify an itemized state-
ment of costs taxed in the court of appeals for 
insertion in the mandate, but the issuance of the 
mandate shall not be delayed for taxation of costs 
and if the mandate has been issued before final 
determination of costs, the statement, or any 
amendment thereof, shall be added to the mandate 
upon request by the clerk of the court of appeals to 
the clerk of the district court. 
(e) Costs on Appeal Taxable in the District 
Courts. Costs incurred in the preparation and 
transmission of the record, the cost of the reporter's 
transcript, if necessary for the determination of tin-
no, too TMo 28 U.S.C.A. 
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